Data Breach Checker

Data Breach Checker

Check if your email or password was exposed in a data breach. Uses Have I Been Pwned database. Check breach details and protect your accounts

Most people's email addresses have appeared in at least one public data breach by 2026 — LinkedIn 2012/2016, Adobe 2013, Yahoo 2013-14, Collection #1 (2019), Twitter 2022 are the big ones, and they keep coming. This checker queries the Have I Been Pwned database (with k-anonymity so your address is never sent in full) and tells you which breaches exposed your data, when, and what type (passwords, emails, addresses, payment info). Then you can act: rotate passwords, enable 2FA, monitor.

How the lookup works without leaking your email

The naive approach is to send your email to a server that checks against a database — which means handing every queried email to whoever runs the service. HIBP and this tool use k-anonymity: hash the email with SHA-1, send only the first 5 characters of the hash to the API, receive all breaches matching that prefix (typically a few hundred entries), and check locally whether your full hash is in the response. The server never sees your full email or hash.

For passwords, the same scheme is used with SHA-1 of the password. You can paste a password and check if it has appeared in any breach without exposing the password itself. The API returns counts; you decide what threshold counts as "compromised" (anything > 0 is bad; > 1 is definitively compromised).

What a breach report looks like

Input

Email: alice@example.com

Output

Found in 7 breaches:

  - LinkedIn (2012)     — 164 million accounts, passwords (SHA-1, unsalted, weak)
  - Adobe (2013)        — 152 million, passwords + password hints in plaintext
  - Dropbox (2012)      — 68 million, bcrypt-hashed passwords
  - Yahoo (2013)        — 3 billion accounts, passwords + security questions
  - Collection #1 (2019)— 773 million email-password pairs aggregated from prior breaches
  - Twitter (2022)      — 5.4 million accounts via API bug, emails + phones
  - 23andMe (2023)      — 6.9 million, genetic data and family relationships

Not in 4500+ tracked breaches.

Action items:
  - LinkedIn / Adobe passwords from 2012-2013 — any service still using those passwords is compromised. Rotate any account that ever used those passwords.
  - 2FA on every account that supports it.
  - Email forwarding rule check — attackers who got LinkedIn access in 2012 often added forwarding rules that still exist.

The 7-breach number is roughly average for an email address active since 2010. The right response is not panic; it is to assume the data is out there and act accordingly — unique passwords per site (password manager), 2FA where supported, and being skeptical of unsolicited contact.

What "compromised" actually means

  • Email + password pair — the most dangerous combination. If the password is reused on other sites, attackers will try it (credential stuffing). This is why password reuse is the single highest-leverage security mistake.
  • Email + plaintext password (Adobe 2013) — same risk, immediate exposure. Rotate any reuse of this password.
  • Email + hashed password — depends on the hash. Unsalted SHA-1 (LinkedIn 2012) is GPU-crackable in hours. bcrypt with high cost factor (Dropbox) is much slower but rainbow tables for common passwords are precomputed.
  • Email + phone (Twitter 2022 API bug) — used for SMS-based phishing and SIM swap targeting.
  • Email + address / DOB / SSN (T-Mobile, Equifax) — identity theft material. Cannot be rotated like a password; harder to mitigate.
  • Email alone — least-impact case, but spam-list inclusion. Most public emails end up on multiple spam lists eventually.

When to reach for this tool

  • You want to know which breaches have exposed your data, prioritized by severity, so you can act on the worst first.
  • You are signing up for a new service and want to know if their domain has been breached recently before trusting them with new data.
  • You are auditing a small team's email addresses and want to flag accounts that need urgent password rotation.
  • You suspect a recent breach (your spam tripled, you got a 2FA prompt you did not initiate) and want to confirm against the public database.

What this tool will not do

  • It will not show your actual leaked passwords. HIBP intentionally does not store plaintexts; you can check if a specific password is in the database but you cannot list "all passwords associated with my email". This is by design — making such a service available would be a one-stop shop for attackers.
  • It will not catch every breach. The database covers public/widely-circulated breaches. Targeted attacks, ransomware-encrypted data that never went public, and breaches the affected company has not disclosed are not in HIBP. Absence of a breach record is not safety.
  • It will not rotate your passwords for you. Tool reports breaches; you are still responsible for password rotation. Use a password manager to track which accounts share passwords with breached services and prioritize rotation.
  • It will not check stolen-credential markets (Genesis, Russian Market). Those operate outside HIBP and require different tooling.

Your email or password is hashed locally before any lookup. The full hash is never sent — only the first 5 hex characters of the SHA-1. This is the same k-anonymity scheme HIBP uses; your queries are private even if HIBP's logs were ever compromised.

Frequently asked questions

Is it safe to type my password into a breach checker?

For HIBP's k-anonymity API, yes. Your password is hashed locally with SHA-1, only the first 5 characters of the hash are sent, the server replies with hash suffixes for matching entries, and your code checks locally. The server cannot reverse "5ABC..." to know which password you queried. The risk reduces to "is the tool you used actually implementing this correctly" — for an open-source library, easy to verify; for a random web tool, trust the source.

My email shows in a breach but I never had an account at that service.

Possible causes: (1) account was created with your email by someone else (intentional malice, signup-by-typo); (2) the "breach" is actually a credential-stuffing dump that includes your email from elsewhere; (3) data aggregator (Apollo, Exactis) scraped your email from public sources and was subsequently breached. The data exists regardless of whether you actively created the account.

How often does the database update?

HIBP adds new breaches as they become known. Some are added immediately; some after a verification period; some are kept private at the affected company's request until they can disclose. A few breaches a month is typical.

Should I be worried if my email is in 5+ breaches?

You should be unsurprised. The realistic security posture is "assume my email + a list of stale passwords is public". Mitigations that work: password manager with unique random passwords per site, 2FA on every account that supports it, separate email addresses for high-value accounts (banks) vs low-value (newsletters).

Does HIBP detect when my data appears on the dark web for sale?

HIBP monitors paste sites and major data dump releases, including some dark-web mirrors. It does not crawl every onion site. For comprehensive dark-web monitoring there are paid services (SpyCloud, Constella). For 95% coverage, HIBP is enough.

I rotated the password — am I safe now?

For the affected account, yes. For any other account that used the same password, you are still vulnerable until those are rotated too. This is why "unique password per site" matters — a breach of one site is one rotation, not fifty.

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Last updated · E-Utils editorial team